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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
PRESIDENCY 
Yel'tsin meets Maskhadov in Moscow 
President Yel'tsin met with Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov on 18 August to 
discuss Chechnya's political status. According to the BBC (World Service, 18 
Aug 97), Yel'tsin claimed he was "prepared to take steps to give Chechnya 
freedom." It is likely that Yel'tsin envisions certain limits to Chechen freedom and 
would like to see an agreement with Maskhadov similar to the one reached with 
Tatarstan's leadership. 
 
Korzhakov book preview a disappointment 
The few excerpts of former presidential bodyguard Alexander Korzhakov's book 
which have seen print thus far seem more the revelations of a vengeful intimate 
than the concerned patriot Korzhakov seeks to portray. In fact, Sovershenno 
sekretno (No. 8; Russian Press Digest, 5 Aug 97, via NEXIS) published 
passages in which Korzhakov described his eventual realization that "he had 
never liked Yel'tsin as a person." When Korzhakov remained with Yel'tsin despite 
his removal from the Politburo, "Korzhakov felt sorry for him. He seemed so weak 
and dejected...." 
 
Perhaps the most publicized passage thus far involves the 1994 incident at 
Shannon airport, during which Yel'tsin remained aboard his plane instead of 
attending meeting with the Irish prime minister. While rumors at the time 
suggested Yel'tsin had been intoxicated, Korzhakov insists that the Russian 
president suffered a "strong heart attack or mini-stroke." Unexplained is how 
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Yel'tsin was capable of exiting the plane and speaking with reporters upon his 
return to Moscow some five hours later. 
 
The book, "Boris Yel'tsin: From Dawn to Sunset," is due to be published this 
week. Korzhakov had difficulty finding a publisher, which prompted speculation 
that the security services or government might be pressuring publishing houses 
to reject the manuscript. A manager from the Mozhaysk printing house 
commented, however, that they "do not engage in gossip" and that they "shall do 
without Korzhakov." (Ekho moskvy, 8 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-220) 
 
GOVERNMENT 
Recent auctions and contradictory comments suggest government division  
The auctions of shares in the Svyazinvest telecommunications company and 
Norilsk Nickel continue to produce curious responses from government officials. 
After First Deputy Premier Nemtsov's exchanges with various media outlets and 
the losing bidders in the Svyazinvest auction, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin 
ordered an investigation of the auction to avoid "any innuendo in this case." 
(Interfax, 30 Jul 97; FBIS-SOV-97-211) 
 
First Deputy Premier Chubais, however, claimed that President Yel'tsin had 
requested the details surrounding the Svyazinvest sale and was satisfied that the 
auction "was held in compliance with the strict rules which were set." (Interfax, 30 
Jul 97; FBIS-SOV-97-211) Yel'tsin's satisfaction with the auctions came into 
question, however, when he released the head of the State Property Committee, 
Alfred Kokh, from government service. 
 
The initial comments from the president's press service claimed that Kokh 
wanted to resign, and that Yel'tsin had praised and thanked him for his service. 
(Interfax, 13 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-225) Within two days, however, as Yel'tsin 
was discussing his new state property chief, Maxim Boiko, Yel'tsin evaluated the 
results of the two recent auctions by claiming, "some banks appear to be closer 
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to the heart of Alfred Kokh and this is not proper." (ITAR-TASS, 15 Aug 97; 
NEXIS) In any event, the replacement of Chubais loyalist Kokh with another 
Chubais supporter, Boiko, suggests there will be little policy change at the State 
Property Committee. 
 
The Norilsk Nickel auction was initially postponed by the prime minister on the 
basis of letters he received from the General Prosecutor, Skuratov, and the 
Minister of Economics, Yasin. Their complaints about the bidding process 
included violations of procedure and unfairly short notice of the auction to 
bidders. Chernomyrdin was apparently persuaded to go ahead with the auction, 
however, after meetings with Oneximbank's Potanin, Chubais and Kokh. (NTV, 5 
Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-217) 
 
MVD 
New interior troops commander appointed 
Colonel-General Leonty Shevtsov has been appointed as the new commander of 
Russian Interior Troops following the resignation of Colonel-General Anatoli 
Shkirko last month. Shevtsov is the former commander of Russian peacekeeping 
troops in Bosnia and served as chief of staff for Russian forces in Chechnya from 
1994-96. (ITAR-TASS, 11 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-223) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Chandler Rosenberger 
 
Assistance from Iran helps Russia enforce USSR-era law on Caspian 
In light of complaints from Turkmenistan, the Russian government agreed on 7 
August to scrap a bilateral deal between Russian and Azeri firms to develop the 
Caspian oil field of Serdar. But Russia, with backing from Tehran, secured a 
promise from Ashgabat to adhere to "previously concluded treaties between the 
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USSR and Iran" until the legal status of the Caspian Sea has been established 
(Interfax, 1604 GMT, 7 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-219). 
 
The agreement to develop the Serdar field had been signed by Lukoil, Rosneft 
and Azerbaijan's state oil company on 4 July, in the presence of Russian First 
Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov and Azeri president Heydar Aliev, and was 
immediately protested by Turkmenistan, which claimed that international law of 
the sea placed the fields within its area of jurisdiction. (See Editorial Digest, July 
17, 1997) 
 
Iran, while declining to take sides overtly, then called for adherence to Soviet-era 
agreements. Iranian deputy foreign minister Mahmud Va'ezi said on 5 August 
that arguments based on the premise that international law now override 
previous treaties "are legally unacceptable and invalid." Va'ezi also decried 
unnamed states that "are behaving in an individualistic manner and signing 
agreements with foreign firms." (IRNA, 1001 GMT, 5 Aug 97; FBIS-NES-97-217). 
Two days later, Turkmenistan endorsed the Iranian position when it was put 
forward again by Russian president Boris Yel'tsin. 
 
Commentators, Foreign Ministry endorse "Eastern" orientation for Russia 
A nearly-unanimous chorus of Russian officials, journalists and scholars has 
praised the performance of Foreign Minister Yevgeni Primakov at last month's 
meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), claiming that it 
marked a welcome shift in Moscow's orientation from West to East. 
 
Primakov's discussion of security issues at ASEAN was a "brilliant diplomatic 
maneuver" according to Obshchaya gazeta, since he "provided a wonderful way 
of giving vent to the irritation about the unceremoniousness of American foreign 
policy which has been building up deep inside ASEAN." Primakov also won the 
support of Indonesia and Malaysia, the paper reported, since "he did not fail to 
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note that the actions of Washington-based Tel Aviv are an insult to Muslims." 
(Obshchaya gazeta, 1 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-217). 
 
Moscow's ties in Southeast Asia, Moskovskiye novosti wrote, come as a 
welcome antidote to the isolation produced by NATO expansion. "The road to the 
West has been blocked indefinitely, despite the ceremony of strategic betrothal 
with NATO that spared our national pride," the paper wrote, noting that the 
resultant expansion to the East "should not lead our diplomats and politicians to 
develop an inferiority complex -- it is obvious that the Pacific region will become 
one of the world's economic (and therefore political) focuses by the beginning of 
the 21st century." (Moskovskiye novosti, 3-10 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-219). 
 
In an interview with "Iran Daily," Yuri Kashlev, the president of Russia's 
diplomatic academy, said that Russia must act as a "bridge between different 
civilizations and economies." While Russia must "integrate and become part of 
the West," Kashlev said, it should also become part of the world economic 
system, which includes many non-Western states. Kashlev singled Iran, China 
and Japan as nations with whom Moscow was cultivating closer ties. (IRNA, 
0948 GMT, 6 Aug 97; FBIS-NES-97-218) 
 
Meanwhile, deputy Foreign Minister Grigori Karasin published a seven-page 
article on the importance of fruitful relations with China. (Problemy dalnego 
vostoka, Mar-Apr). Yevgeni Bazhanov, director of the Institute of Current 
International Issues, praised arms sales to Beijing, since they would "gradually 
bind" Russia's "gigantic neighbor" to the Russian defense industry. "The 
necessity for spare parts, shells, etc," Bazhanov wrote, "will turn Beijing into our 
friendly partner for many years." (Obshchaya gazeta, 7-13 Aug 97; FBIS-TAC-
97-224). 
 
Czech newspaper, Slovak politician say Russian agents active in Bratislava 
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Analysts from the Foreign Ministry and the security services of the Czech 
Republic have concluded that Russian agents use Slovakia as a base for 
monitoring and influencing politics in Central Europe, according to the Czech 
daily Denni Telegraf. 
 
In addition, a Slovak opposition politician has claimed that the Slovak intelligence 
agency is so compromised by Russian agents that Western nations hold it at 
arms length. 
 
The appointment in 1995 of Ivan Lexa as head of the Slovak Intelligence Service 
convinced the West that Russia had gained too much influence in Bratislava, 
according to Vladimir Palko, a former deputy director of the Czechoslovak secret 
service. Lexa, a confidante of Slovak premier Vladimir Meciar who had close ties 
to the former regime, inaugurated a return to influence of former agents of the 
Communist secret police (StB), who "have a natural tendency to orient 
themselves toward this particular side, as they did 10 years ago... (I)t means that 
the Slovak Republic's real foreign policy political orientation is an orientation 
toward Russia." (Sme, 4 Aug 97; FBIS-EEU-97-217). 
 
Comment 
The "Eurasian" vision fills the "national" void 
Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeni Primakov abhors a vacuum. In any 
international sphere in which the West has failed to provide confident leadership, 
Primakov has darted in, fax machines spinning, with proposals and position 
papers. It should therefore come as no surprise that his ministry is steadfastly 
filling in gaps in domestic politics as well. 
 
While President Boris Yel'tsin's commission on a new "national idea" has 
returned from the provinces as confused as when it left, Primakov is building a 
consensus among Moscow's elite that Russia has a peculiarly "Eastern" mission. 
The tributes to his performance at the meeting of the Association of Southeast 
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Asian Nations (ASEAN) are more than merely obsequious; his colleagues at the 
ministry and collaborators in the press have settled on ties to Asia as the salve 
for the purportedly "wounded" national pride. 
 
Never mind that in negotiations over the expansion of NATO and future of the G-
7, the Western nations have given Moscow a status disproportionate to its 
standing in world affairs. Since the war in Chechnya began three years ago, all 
thought of replacing Communist-style imperialism with healthy domestic rebirth 
has been scrapped. The West's own failure to challenge Russia's hegemonic 
instincts have allowed the nation's worst elements free to seek a new mission 
wherever they fancied. 
 
Asia has its own appeal. There a Russian nationalist can find leaders 
sympathetic to what one commentator has called "another conception of human 
rights, different from the Western conception." After all, the journalist noted, 
"even at the height of the Chechen war, Beijing did not reproach Russia (it has a 
headache with its own "separatists" in Taiwan and Tibet)." The unreformed 
Communist can be "touched by the red color of the Chinese national flag and the 
formally unchallenged role of the (Chinese) Communist Party." (Moskovsiye 
novosti, 3-10 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-219). And such a mission can pay financial 
dividends. For the price of one scrapped oil deal, Russian-Iranian cooperation 
has restored the pre-1991 hegemony of Moscow and Tehran over the Caspian 
Sea. 
 
How will the United States respond to Russia's drift East? Some commentators 
have noted that the State Department appears to be softening its line against 
Iran in the hope of outbidding the Russians for influence. But there is another 
alternative, one that would both restrain Russia's behavior and give heart to 
Moscow's democrats. The United States could openly condemn Primakov's 
maneuvers as incompatible with the spirit of a healthy post-imperial Russian 
restoration, and insist that a peaceful future must be secured by abandoning the 
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legacy of adventurism. Such a line would come too late for the dead of Tajikistan, 
Georgia, Moldova and Chechnya, but would better head off future catastrophes 
than appeasement could. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Political Parties and Legislative 
Branch 
By Michael Thurman 
 
FEDERAL ASSEMBLY 
Speaker Lukyanov considers Dyachenko's appointment 
The recent appointment of Boris Yel'tsin's daughter Tatyana Dyachenko as 
presidential adviser has, according to Lukyanov, broken the law on state service. 
The dispute revolves around Dyachenko's status as state employee rather than 
personal advisor to the president. Were Yel'tsin to have appointed her as a 
personal advisor, no law would have been violated. However, as a member of 
the executive office, Speaker Lukyanov claims that laws have been broken. 
 
The president claims the appointment of his daughter did not violate the law 
since he, as Russian president, is not a state employee. It would seem that the 
issue revolves around the status of appointed versus elected state officials as 
being state employees. Speaker Lukyanov admitted that the applicability of this 
law to the president -- indeed all elected persons -- is not clear, however the 
speaker believes the law has been violated. (Sovetskaya rossiya, 3 Jul 97; FBIS-
SOV-97-184) 
 
Federation Council forbids the sale of agricultural land 
After much debate, the Federation Council finally passed the bill adopted by the 
Duma in June 1997. This result is perhaps a combination of the communist 
majority in the Duma with its agrarian connections, and a regional interest in 
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maintaining the local power hierarchy. Whether the president signs the law, or 
even heeds it in the case of a veto override, is not clear. 
 
Large-scale land reform -- via sale or forced redistribution -- does not seem likely. 
The losers, besides the Russian consumer, are those who would have "forty 
acres and mule." (Interfax, 1042 GMT, 3 Jul 97; FBIS-SOV-97-184) 
 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
Gen. Rokhlin is appointed as chairman of movement to support army 
Chairman of the Russian Duma's Defense Committee Gen. Lev Rokhlin is to 
head a committee whose purpose is the defense of the army. Ex-defense 
minister Igor Rodionov will be his first deputy. 
 
The creation of the committee raises two interesting issues. First, it is possible 
that the organizational political power of the army as it is presently constituted is 
insufficient for its needs, otherwise a special advocacy group would not be 
needed. Second, the Duma is seen as being an appropriate venue for redress, 
that is, a dispenser of political patronage. This suggests that the legislative 
process may be seen by many to be a useful means for attaining their aims. 
(Interfax, 1110 GMT, 9 Jul 97; FBIS-SOV-97-190) 
 
ELECTIONS 
Nizhniy Novgorod election results 
The electoral marathon in Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast has ended in a victory for the 
former mayor, Ivan Petrovich Sklyarov, with 52% of the vote. His opponent, 
Gennadiy Khodyrev, received 42 [sic] percent. The turnout in this second round 
(50%) was higher than the first (40%). Sklyarov is former Governor Nemtsov's 
man. The regional media which first reported the election results see this as a 
victory not only of Nemtsov's earlier activities in the city, but also of his present 
job in Moscow and of Yel'tsin's path of reform. (Rossiyskiye vesti, 15 Jul 97; 
FBIS-SOV-97-197) 
 10 
 
 
Newly Independent States: CIS 
By Mark Jones 
 
Mixed signals for peacekeepers in Georgia 
Russian soldiers serving in the CIS peacekeeping troops in Georgia who were 
hoping to return home in August were put on an emotional roller-coaster recently. 
As late as 30 July, Russian Foreign Ministry envoy Lev Mironov was saying that 
the soldiers would begin pulling out on 1 August if Tbilisi did not officially request 
their continued presence (Interfax, 30 Jul 97; FBIS-SOV-97-211). If the soldiers' 
hopes were raised by that statement, they were dashed the next day by 
Lieutenant-General Aleksandr Arinakhin, an assistant to the chief of the Russian 
General Staff. According to Arinakhin, "Yes, officially, the peacekeepers' 
mandate in the region ended today but this does not mean that they won't be 
there tomorrow" (ITAR-TASS, 31 Jul 97; FBIS-UMA-97-212). 
 
This apparent discrepancy in views might be explained as an example of astute 
politicking by the Foreign Ministry (to put pressure on Georgia), or by a 
fundamental difference in interpretation of policy by the ministry and the General 
Staff. What is even more interesting is the discrepancy between the two 
organizations regarding who has the authority to order a withdrawal. According to 
Mironov, a decision by all CIS leaders (heads of state) is necessary to terminate 
the operation (ITAR-TASS, 31 Jul 97; FBIS-SOV-97-212). However, according to 
Arinakhin, President Yel'tsin, acting as chairman of the Council of Heads of 
State, can "make such a decision on behalf of the council..." In other words, at 
least as far as the Russian General Staff is concerned, Boris Yel'tsin is the de 
facto commander-in-chief of CIS armed forces. 
 
Non-peacekeeping in Tajikistan 
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Peacekeeping efforts have obviously gone awry in Tajikistan. But as the situation 
there spirals out of control, a top official at the Russian Defense Ministry told 
Interfax (11 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-223) that, "The CIS Collective Peacekeeping 
Forces are not interfering in the armed conflicts in Tajikistan." Prudence, 
however, required the peacekeepers to set up three "block posts" on the outskirts 
of Dushanbe complete with "armoured vehicles to evacuate servicemen in case 
of emergency." The peacekeepers also stationed three tanks near the 
headquarters of the 201st division "to prevent provocations." The local 
commander of CIS forces, Boris Dyukov, elaborated on the limits of his authority. 
According to an interview in Interfax (12 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-224), Dyukov will 
order his soldiers to protect Tajik military and government sites "only after the 
CIS leadership makes an official decision to this effect." 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Mark Jones 
 
MOLDOVA 
Who says we aren't independent? 
Even though not one international organization has recognized the Dniester 
region of Moldova as an independent republic, leaders there continue to act as if 
they deserve precisely that recognition. Recently, "border guards" of the 
unrecognized republic refused to let the Moldovan minister of defense cross into 
the region because officials in Chisinau did not file the proper papers with 
officials in Tiraspol. The minister was on his way to attend the Open Doors Day 
with the group of Russian troops and claimed that, since Dniester is part of 
Moldova, no coordination was necessary (NTV, 3 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-215). 
Tiraspol leader Igor Smirnov also called for a law declaring Dniester a "customs 
control zone." Smirnov's son, Vladimir, who is the chairman of the region's 
customs committee, said it was necessary for prosecutors, police, customs 
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officials, and border guards to work more closely to control access roads passing 
by customs checkpoints (Baspress, 30 Jul 97; FBIS-SOV-97-212). 
 
BELARUS 
Raising the stakes 
Sergei Posakhaw, an aide to President Lukashenka, told a Radiostantsiya ekho 
moskvy correspondent that Belarus will station nuclear weapons on its territory "if 
nuclear weapons were deployed on the territory of NATO's new members" (30 
Jul 97; FBIS-TAC-97-211). 
 
More fallout from ORT arrests 
The leaders of the Belarusian Association of Journalists (BAJ) protested against 
the criminal prosecution of Russian television network employees. In a press 
release, the leaders called the Belarusian authorities' actions, "a blatant 
manifestation of totalitarianism and a flagrant violation of human rights and 
freedom of speech" (Belapan, 31 Jul 97; FBIS-SOV-97-212). For his part, 
President Lukashenka claimed that the Russian journalists were being paid by 
"foreign special services," but declined to specify which services were involved. 
Lukashenka also claimed that the detainees were Belarusian, not Russian, 
citizens (Interfax, 31 Jul 97). 
 
Even Russian President Boris Yel'tsin condemned the actions of the Belarusian 
authorities, calling Lukashenka "inexperienced" and requesting an explanation of 
his actions. Lukashenka responded with characteristic anger and paranoia. He 
canceled a trip to Kaliningrad over the issue (Radio Minsk, 0900 GMT, 1 Aug 97; 
FBIS-SOV-97-213) and said, "I will provide explanations to Yel'tsin but (only) 
after he gives me explanations over the war the Russian TV channels have 
unleashed against me" (FBIS-SOV-97-212). This statement can only cause us to 
wonder whether the ORT reporters were arrested for "violating the border" as 
they are charged, or because the president doesn't like their opinions. 
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Erecting fences 
President Lukashenka signed a decree on 30 July (Radio Minsk, 1600 GMT, 30 
Jul 97; FBIS-SOV-97-211) implementing measures "to strengthen the guarding of 
the state border." In accordance with the decree, a border group is being created 
in Brest in order to improve security on the border with Poland, Lithuania and 
Latvia. A similar detachment is being set up in Gomel to "organize guarding of 
the state border with Ukraine." The question is, what is Lukashenka guarding 
against? 
 
UKRAINE 
Udovenko looks westward 
Hennadiy Udovenko, recently re-appointed as foreign minister, gave an interview 
to Interfax (1 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-213) in which he outlined Ukraine's foreign 
policy goals. In addition to "laying a foreign policy accent on the economy," 
Udovenko listed cooperation with the European Union as a priority. He also 
called for the pursuit of a "strategic policy of gradual integration into European 
and Euro-atlantic structures." 
 
Problems in parliament 
According to Interfax (30 Jul 97; FBIS-SOV-97-211), President Kuchma's 
administration is considering dissolving the Ukrainian Supreme Council if it fails 
to open another session soon. The council suspended its work on 18 July and, 
according to the Ukrainian Constitution, the president has the authority to 
dissolve parliament if it does not hold a session within 30 days of its last meeting. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
AZERBAIJAN 
Russia and Azerbaijan reach partial agreement on radar station lease 
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On 8 August Russian and Azeri authorities initialed a protocol defining the basic 
principles for the agreement on the lease of the Gabala radar station. Azerbaijani 
First Deputy Prime Minister Abbas Abbasov explained that the protocol 
recognizes the station, its movable equipment, and the land it occupies as 
Azerbaijani property. Abbasov also stated that a number of unspecified aspects 
remain to be settled before the agreement can be signed. Presidents Geyder 
Aliev and Boris Yel'tsin were scheduled to sign the agreement during Aliev's July 
visit to Moscow but did not. Some believe that the Azerbaijani side refused to 
sign the document because Russia has failed to extradite Azerbaijan's former 
president, Ayaz Mutalibov, who is accused of plotting coup attempts against 
Aliev. (Turan, 8 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-221) 
 
The Gabala station monitors air space for Russian nuclear forces and, according 
to Colonel General Viktor Smirnov, commander of the Russian air defense 
troops, "is a latest generation station," one that is "immensely significant for 
Russia's defense capability." (Turan, 2 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-216) Since 1991 
Russia has accumulated an unpaid debt of 100 billion rubles to Azerbaijan for the 
electricity and water that the station uses. 
 
US OSCE representative raises land swap possibility for Karabakh 
A proposal first put forth by Academician Andrei Sakharov in 1989 and revived 
later by US expert Paul Goble has been taken up a third time by John Maresca, 
the US representative to the OSCE Minsk Group. (Azadlyg, 8 Aug 97; FBIS-
SOV-97-220) Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey Bulent Ecevit also put forward this 
idea recently, while the US Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, has voiced 
doubt that this "prospect holds out very much hope." (FDCH Political Transcripts, 
21 Jul 97) 
 
The proposal consists of a land swap: the Lachin corridor, which connects 
Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh, would be traded for the Mergi district, which 
connects Azerbaijan to Nakhichevan. By making Azerbaijani and Armenian 
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territories contiguous, this arrangement would ease the security concerns for the 
Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh and the Azeri population of the 
Nakhichevan exclave. Moreover, Azerbaijan would gain a direct path to Turkey's 
border, and therefore a path for oil pipeline construction that avoids Armenia, 
Georgia, and Russia. One major difficulty with the plan is that Armenia has never 
admitted that its forces participated in the war over Nagorno-Karabakh, and is 
therefore under no obligation to cede anything to the other parties. While it is 
conceivable that the population of the Lachin area (which has now been 
thoroughly cleansed of its pre-war Azeri and Kurd inhabitants), may not object to 
integration into Armenia, there is no reason to suppose that those residing in the 
Mergi region would want to be transferred to Azerbaijan's jurisdiction. 
 
GEORGIA 
Shevardnadze and Ardzinba support different Russian proposals 
Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze stated on 1 August that President 
Yel'tsin's outline of key principles for a settlement of the conflict in Abkhazia, 
which was issued on the same day, "presages the final solution to the peace-
makers problem." Shevardnadze summarized those principles as "Return of 
refugees, territorial integrity of Georgia, broad rights of Abkhazia within the 
framework of the united Georgian state, a corresponding division of powers and 
the use of Russian practices as an example." (ITAR-TASS, 1 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-
97-213) The Abkhaz side favors a different Russian proposal embodied in a 
protocol negotiated by Foreign Minister Yevgeni Primakov and Abkhaz President 
Vladislav Ardzinba. (Interfax, 4 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-217) Primakov's proposal 
includes no mention of Georgian territorial integrity but would require the Abkhaz 
to honor an April 1994 UN mediated agreement on the gradual return of refugees 
to Abkhazia. In view of these fundamental differences, the 14 August declaration 
signed by Shevardnadze and Ardzinba in Tbilisi pledging the non-use of force to 
settle the dispute can only be seen as a largely symbolic exercise that 
commemorates the five-year anniversary of the war's start. 
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Since Shevardnadze's trip to the US in July, the Russian side has intensified its 
mediation efforts hoping to forestall western involvement and remain the sole 
mediator of the Abkhaz conflict. As part of his 1 August proposal, Yel'tsin invited 
Ardzinba and Shevardnadze to Moscow to hammer out the details of the peace. 
The Georgian side has made it clear that such a meeting would have to follow 
substantial progress on the major issues, including Georgian territorial integrity 
and the return of refugees. 
 
Military contacts 
Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeev sought a statement from his Georgian 
counterpart Vardiko Nadibaidze endorsing the presence of Russian 
peacekeepers in Georgia. The Georgian side refused and insisted on postponing 
the issue until the next CIS summit, which is scheduled for October. During the 
same trip to Moscow, Nadibaidze met with Anatolyi Kvashin, chief of the Russian 
General Staff, and asked him to hand over to Georgia several military facilities 
including the Aleksaeva military airfield and the Tbilisi tank factory. (Iprinda, 2 
Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-214) 
 
A few days later the chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, John Shalikashvili, 
arrived in Tbilisi for a short visit the purpose of which was to "examine the issues 
of deepening U.S. Georgian military cooperation." (Rossiyskaya gazeta, 5 Aug 
97; FBIS-SOV-97-218). 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
TAJIKISTAN 
Turf war erupts in Dushanbe, spreads west and south 
Early on the morning of 9 August a battle broke out between two rival "pro-
government" commanders in the northern district of Dushanbe. The fighting 
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lasted approximately four hours and involved the supporters of Colonel Suhrob 
Qosimov, commander of a special rapid reaction brigade in the Tajik Interior 
Ministry, and the supporters of Yaqubjon Salimov, chairman of the Tajik Customs 
Committee. Law enforcement agencies sealed the area off and government 
officials tried to set up negotiations between the two feuding commanders, once 
the fighting died down and a cease-fire was declared (Interfax, 0848 GMT, 9 Aug 
97; FBIS-UMA-97-221). According to initial reports, as a result of this battle five 
people were killed, and 12 others were wounded (Voice of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran, 1600 GMT, 9 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-221). 
 
Before negotiations could get underway between Qosimov and Salimov, a new 
battle erupted outside of Dushanbe near the Fakhrobod Pass (approximately 35 
km south of Dushanbe), where a group of Col. Mahmud Khudoiberdiev's men 
clashed with members of the presidential guard (Interfax, 1648 GMT, 9 Aug 97; 
FBIS-SOV-97-221). Col. Khudoiberdiev's troops took control of the Fakhrobod 
Pass in June, in an attempt to intimidate the Tajik government into changing the 
terms of the inter-Tajik peace agreement, which was signed on 27 June by 
United Tajik Opposition (UTO) leader Said Abdullo Nuri and President 
Rahmonov (see Editorial Digests for June 1997). Khudoiberdiev supports 
Salimov's group in the current conflict, and announced that if Qosimov's forces 
did not leave Dushanbe, he would begin moving additional troops from his base 
in Qurghon Teppa toward the capital, presumably to aid Salimov and his 
supporters (Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1600 GMT, 9 Aug 97; FBIS-
SOV-97-221). 
 
There are conflicting reports as to whether Col. Khudoiberdiev's forces were 
actually able to enter Dushanbe. An Interfax report from 9 August stated that his 
troops had managed to take over military posts in the outskirts of the capital, and 
that the government forces had surrendered with little resistance and retreated 
into the city's center (Interfax, 1823 GMT, 9 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-221). General 
Ghafur Mirzoev, commander of the Presidential Guard, denied all reports that 
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Col. Khudoiberdiev's men had entered the city, and instead stated that since the 
morning of 10 August, the colonel's forces had made three attacks on 
Presidential Guard units, in an attempt to break into Dushanbe. According to 
General Mirzoev, none of these attacks was successful (ITAR-TASS, 1125 GMT, 
10 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-222). On the same day, Col. Qosimov managed to rout 
Salimov and his supporters and drive them out of the city (Radiostantsiya ekho 
moskvy, 1200 GMT, 10 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-222). Salimov and most of his 
men fled west, into the mountains and toward the Uzbek-Tajik border. The Uzbek 
government responded by closing that section of its border and by putting its 
border guards on alert (RFE/RL Newsline, 12 Aug 97). Col. Qosimov and 
General Mirzoev are also reported to have moved some of their troops westward, 
to the town of Tursunzade, the site of a large aluminum plant which has been 
occupied by Col. Khudoiberdiev's forces since January 1996. Qosimov's and 
Mirzoev's men apparently managed to regain control of the plant, and Col. 
Khudoiberdiev's troops fled into the mountain gorges surrounding the nearby 
towns of Shakhrinau and Hissar (Interfax, 0928 GMT, 11 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-
223). Gen. Mirzoev announced that his units would not remain in Tursunzade, 
but would allow local authorities to restore order in the area (ITAR-TASS, 1217 
GMT, 11 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-223). Qosimov and his troops remained in the 
vicinity, ostensibly to conduct a "mop-up" operation in the surrounding towns and 
villages, in order to destroy the last remnants of resistance by Col. 
Khudoiberdiev's troops (NTV, 0400 GMT, 11 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-223). 
 
However, there were also reports that Qosimov's men began carrying out 
reprisals against members of the local population whom they suspected of 
having aided and/or sympathized with Col. Khudoiberdiev's and Yaqubjon 
Salimov's supporters. Uzbeks and "Leninabadtsy" (people originally from the 
northern Tajik oblast' Leninobod) were singled out and beaten, raped, and, in 
some cases, summarily executed. There were also reports that Qosimov's forces 
had set up checkpoints on the road from Tursunzade to Dushanbe and were 
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stopping and harassing anyone suspected of being Uzbek or from Leninobod 
Oblast' (RFE/RL Newsline, 14 Aug 97). 
 
Meanwhile, General Mirzoev's Presidential Guard units launched an all-out attack 
on Col. Khudoiberdiev's forces to the south, in an attempt to push the colonel out 
of his stronghold in Qurghon Teppa. Mirzoev's men briefly regained control of the 
Fakhrobod Pass on 12 August, but had to retreat to their previous positions (near 
the village of Gagarin, 12 km south of the capital) when Khudoiberdiev's troops 
counterattacked. Mirzoev's units met with greater success near Qurghon Teppa , 
however, when they succeeded in taking control of Sarband (formerly known as 
Kalininabad), a village only 10 km east of Col. Khudoiberdiev's headquarters 
(Interfax, 1753 GMT, 12 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-224). 
 
On 13 August, President Rahmonov issued a decree stripping the colonel of his 
command, but apparently promised to transfer him to another government 
position (Interfax, 1826 GMT, 13 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-225). The two men finally 
met face-to-face in a location south of Dushanbe on the same day, and in 
addition to agreeing to give up his command, Col. Khudoiberdiev also agreed to 
a truce (Interfax, 1107 GMT, 14 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-226). In accordance with 
the truce, the colonel withdrew his forces from the Fakhrobod Pass and the 
highway between Dushanbe and Qurghon Teppa was reopened (NTV, 0500 
GMT, 14 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-226). 
 
However, even though Col. Khudoiberdiev initially agreed to comply with the 
president's decree, the Autonomous Defense Council of the Khatlon and 
Qurghon Teppa zones (a council of local southern commanders loyal to Col. 
Khudoiberdiev which was formed on 20 July and which has been declared illegal 
by the Tajik government) rejected President Rahmonov's order (Interfax, 1641 
GMT, 13 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-225). Furthermore, already one day after his 
meeting with President Rahmonov, Col. Khudoiberdiev seemed to be rethinking 
his response to the truce agreement. In an interview with Russian NTV, he 
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frankly admitted that he had not yet begun to implement the terms of the truce in 
Qurghon Teppa , because government troops were continuing to advance on his 
headquarters from the nearby town of Sarband (NTV, 0500 GMT, 14 Aug 97; 
FBIS-SOV-97-226). 
 
Comment 
Perhaps the greatest danger which faces Tajikistan today is the power struggle 
between military commanders who are nominally loyal to the government, but 
mainly concerned with preserving and/or strengthening their spheres of 
influence, now that the final peace agreement between the current Tajik 
government and the UTO has been signed, and a new government is to be 
formed. The prospect that political stability may take hold in Tajikistan is not 
necessarily cause for celebration on the part of many local government 
commanders, because it means that their services might no longer be needed. 
The loss of their positions as military commanders would also mean the loss of 
the local fiefdoms which many of them have managed to build up over the course 
of the war. Furthermore, competition for civilian administrative positions has 
become much fiercer, now that the new government is to include the UTO. It is 
not clear exactly what sparked the battle between Yaqubjon Salimov and Colonel 
Qosimov -- some reports say that violence broke out after one of Qosimov's 
relatives was killed by one of Salimov's supporters (Voice of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran, 1600 GMT, 9 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-221), and other accounts state that 
the shooting was simply the result of a turf war between two of Dushanbe's more 
powerful mafia bosses. Ironically, Qosimov and Salimov used to be allies. They 
were both strong supporters of former President Nabiev and they were both 
members of the Popular Front militia, which was formed in early summer 1992. 
Salimov's connection to Col. Khudoiberdiev is also not entirely clear, but perhaps 
Salimov had strong ties to members of Khudoiberdiev's Autonomous Defense 
Council, many of whom were also in the Popular Front militia. 
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Fortunately, the CIS peacekeepers and Russian military and border guard units 
stationed in Tajikistan have thus far been able to avoid becoming involved in the 
latest round of violence. The CIS peacekeeping command assisted in negotiating 
a cease-fire between Salimov and Qosimov (ITAR-TASS World Service, 1142 
GMT, 9 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-221), and was also instrumental in setting up the 
meeting between President Rahmonov and Col. Khudoiberdiev on 13 August 
(NTV, 0800 GMT, 13 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-225). The UTO has also declared its 
neutrality and has urged the two sides to negotiate a peaceful end to the conflict 
(Clandestine Voice of Free Tajikistan, 0350 GMT, 11 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-
223). It would appear, however, that Uzbekistan may bear some responsibility for 
Col. Khudoiberdiev's actions. As mentioned in a previous Editorial Digest (July 
23, 1997), there have been rumors that Uzbekistan supplied aid to 
Khudoiberdiev. Whether there is any truth to these rumors, Col. Qosimov 
certainly seems to believe that it is the primarily the Uzbeks and the 
"Leninabadtsy" who have been supporting Khudoiberdiev's forces in western 
Tajikistan in the vicinity of Tursunzade and Hissare. (Note: Khujand is the capital 
of Leninobod Oblast' and the Khujandis are suspected of being responsible for 
the attempt on Uzbekistan.) Qosimov's actions may presage another government 
crackdown in Leninobod Oblast' itself, once the current conflict has been 
resolved. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Kate Martin 
 
All for one? 
Unlike the European Union, which began membership talks with only one Baltic 
State, Estonia, NATO should approach all three Baltic states together, according 
to Keith Smith, the Clinton administration's nominee for US Ambassador to 
Lithuania. In his confirmation hearings in late July, Smith aligned himself with the 
adamant pro-NATO stance of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, and said he 
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planned to "work very vigorously" to help the Baltic states prepare for inclusion in 
the alliance. (Federal News Service, July 29, 1997; NEXIS) 
 
Military preparedness will be a major stumbling block to such inclusion, however. 
According to Colonel Zenonas Vegelevicius, commander of the Lithuanian air 
force, that service is still unable to repel an attack by air. He cites the need for 
vehicles, landing locations, and a threefold increase (from 1,000 to 4,000) of 
troops. (ELTA, 0644 GMT, 30 Jul 97; FBIS-UMA-97-211). His colleague, Major 
Gediminas Sneideris, who led the Lithuanian contingent in the international 
Cooperative Safeguard exercises in Iceland earlier this month, said that the lack 
of modern, NATO-compatible military equipment and communication skills (i.e., 
English language) caused some difficulties for the Lithuanian troops taking part. 
(ELTA, 1536 GMT, 5 Aug; FBIS-UMA-97-217). 
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